Europe as the idea, model and reality: complex nature of Europe's significance for Russia.  Jean Monnet/Robert Schuman Paper Series Vol. 8, No. 3, April 2011 by Moulioukova, Dina
 
 
1 
 
 
 
   
   
   
                                                                                    R. Schuman 
 
Miami-Florida European Union Center of Excellence 
 
 
      Europe as the Idea, Model and Reality:  
complex nature of Europe’s significance for Russia 
                                          
Dina Moulioukova 
   
 
                     
   
   Vol. 8, No. 3 
April, 2011    
January 2011 
   
 
Published with the support of the EU Commission  
 
2 
 
 The Jean Monnet/Robert Schuman Paper Series 
 
The Jean Monnet/Robert Schuman Paper Series is produced by the Jean Monnet Chair of the University 
of Miami, in cooperation with the Miami-Florida European Union Center of Excellence, a partnership 
with Florida International University (FIU). 
These monographic papers analyze ongoing developments within the European Union as well as recent 
trends which influence the EU’s relationship with the rest of the world.  Broad themes include, but are not 
limited to: 
 
  The collapse of the Constitution and its rescue by the Lisbon Treaty 
  Turkey: prospects of membership 
  Immigration crisis and cultural challenges 
  Security threats and responses 
  The EU and Latin America 
  The EU as a model and reference in the world 
  The Common Agricultural Policy and other public subsidies  
  The euro and the dollar 
  EU image in the United States 
 
These topics form part of the pressing agenda of the EU and represent the multifaceted and complex 
nature of the European integration process.  These papers also seek to highlight the internal and external 
dynamics which influence the workings of the EU and its relationship with the rest the world. 
 
Miami - Florida European Union Center                                Jean Monnet Chair Staff 
 
University of Miami                      Joaquín Roy (Director) 
1000 Memorial Drive                      Astrid Boening (Associate Director) 
101 Ferré Building                                 María Lorca (Associate Editor)   
Coral Gables, FL 33124-2231                                          Maxime Larivé (Research Assistant)                           
Phone:  305-284-3266                                            
Fax: (305) 284 4406 
Web: www.miami.edu/eucenter                                                Florida International University 
                                                                                                   Rebecca Friedman (FIU, Co-Director)                                                                                                                                                                                                                                  
                                       
Inter-American Jean Monnet Chair Editorial Board: 
 
Carlos Hakansson, Universidad de Piura, Perú 
Finn Laursen, Dalhousie University, Halifax, Canada 
Fernando Laiseca, ECSA Latinoamérica 
Michel Levi-Coral, Universidad Andina Simón Bolívar, Quito, Ecuador 
Félix Peña, Universidad Nacional de Tres de Febrero, Buenos Aires, Argentina 
Stephan Sberro, Instituto Tecnológico Autónomo de México 
Eric Tremolada, Universidad del Externado de Colombia, Bogotá, Colombia 
 
International Jean Monnet Chair Editorial Advisors: 
 
Federiga Bindi, University Tor Vergata, Rome 
Blanca Vilà, Autonomous University of Barcelona  
Francesc Granell, University of Barcelona, Spain  
 
3 
 
 
 
Europe as the Idea, Model and Reality: complex nature of Europe’s 
significance for Russia1 
 
Dina Moulioukova
 
 
Europe and Russia are overlapping entities. Half of Europe is Russia; half of Russia is in 
Europe. 
             Vladimir Baranovsky (2000) 
 
We believe that politics is about perceptions and that Russia’s historic perceptions of 
Europe effect contemporary Russia-EU relations. 
          Nikita Lomagin (2009, p. 55)  
 
 
Introduction 
 
Throughout history the identity of Russia has been equally puzzling for Russia itself and for 
its neighbors. By being both a European and an Asian country geographically, Russia has 
always presented the dilemma of whether it is ‘a part of Europe or apart from Europe’ 
(Stent, 2007, p. 393). Therefore, Europe has been and continues to be significant for Russia. 
Such importance can explain why Russia’s relation with Europe might be more complex 
than Europe’s relation with any other state. The goal of this  paper is to argue that the 
complexity of Russian-European relations can be explained by Russia’s multidimensional 
perception of Europe that extends beyond the notion of geopolitics. To understand fully the 
dynamics of Russian-European relations one should analyze them from three distinct, but 
interconnected, dimensions of Russia’s perception of Europe: Europe as an idea, Europe as 
a model, and Europe as a geopolitical reality (Stent, 2007, p. 393). The purpose of this 
paper is to demonstrate some of the complexities of current Russian European relations by 
applying this three dimensional analysis. 
 
Europe as an Idea 
 
Europe has played the role of Russia’s ‘significant other’ for centuries shaping domestic 
debates and creating the context in which Russian rulers defined their values (Tsygankov, 
                                                           
1 This paper is scheduled for inclusion in Roger E. Kanet and Maria Raquel Freire, eds., Russia and European 
Security, currently under review at Palgrave Macmillan.  The author notes her appreciation to the editors for 
editorial recommendations. 
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EU-Russian relations. Ms. Moulioukova currently works as a research assistant at the European Union Center at the 
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n.d.).  Europe  as  an  idea  was  more  a  cultural  concept  and  served  as  an  aspiration  for 
Russia’s  progressive  and  liberal  forces  that  wanted  Russia  to  become  more  Western. 
However it is important to note that idea of Europe for some Russian intellectuals does not 
equal  the  notion  of  the  West  (Morozov,  2003).  For  some  Russian  analysts  (Morozov, 
Karaganov and Kortunov) the idea of Europe is almost never referred to as something alien 
to Russia, antagonistic to its values. The concept of the West, however, in many instances 
symbolizes values opposed to what Russia stands for. It can be explained in part by the 
association of Europe with the ‘high’ culture version of Western society, with the genius of 
the Enlightenment, Venice and the uniquely attractive humanistic and democratic model of 
development (Karaganov, 2007), in contrast to the mass American culture of hedonism and 
consumerism  (Kortunov,  2008,  p.  11)  with  which  Russian  intellectuals  do  not  see 
themselves associated. The attractiveness of the European versus the American idea for 
Russia can also be explained by the supranational nature of European identity itself that for 
many  Russian  intellectuals  is  similar  to  Russia’s  own  supranational  nature,  first  as  a 
multinational empire and as a supranational Soviet state comprised of national republics 
(Kortunov, 2008).  
It was the idea of Europe that created the major division into Westernizers and 
Slavophiles within the Russian intelligentsia in search of Russian identity. Westernizers 
believed that Russia has always been an integral part of the Western cultural mainstream, 
and separation from it happened as a result of the Mongolian yoke (Pritzel, 1998, p. 160). 
Therefore, Russia is destined to return to the West’s orbit. Westernizers argued that for 
Russia to realize its potential as a great power it had to overcome its backwardness, adopt 
Western customs and find ways of integrating with the rest of Europe. Otherwise, Russia 
was  condemned  to  isolation,  exclusion  and  impotence  (Lomagin,  2009,  p.  58).  For 
Westernizers  the  idea  of  Europe  involved  post-Enlightenment  concepts  such  as 
representative government, the importance of the individual, the limitation of the power of 
rulers, and later the development of capitalism and democracy (Stent, 2007, p. 393). 
 Slavophiles, who emerged as a response to Westernism, believed that Russia has a 
unique destiny and has to follow its own path. The uniqueness of Russia was determined by 
its  history,  semi-Asiatic  heritage,  Orthodox  religion  and  communal  institutions.  They 
believed  in the  messianic  nature  of  Russia  that  was  called  to  heal  by  the  power  of  its 
example the social divisions inside Russia and the spiritual wounds of Europe ravaged by 
revolution and war (Billington, 2004, p. 13). Slavophiles saw all of human history as a 
struggle between spiritual and material forces. They believed that Russian values could not 
be  reconciled  with  the  individualistic  and  materialistic  values  of  the  Western  world 
(Lomagin, 2009, p. 58). 
Europe was also influenced by Russia. However, there was no parallel debate in 
Europe about whether it should emulate Russia; Russia was perceived neither as a model 
nor as an idea (Stent, 2007, p. 403). Instead, Europeans viewed Russia as a backward, 
almost barbaric, society with a repressive political system. For much of Europe Russia was 
the antimodel, the antithesis of what an enlightened society should be, as noted by Marquis 
de Custine 
If ever your sons should be discontented with France, try my recipe; tell them to go 
to Russia. It is a useful journey for every foreigner: whoever has well examined the 
country will be content to live somewhere else. (cited in Stent, 2007, p. 404). 
  
 
5 
 
The idea of Europe as geographic and cultural concept first started influencing the 
Russian political class with Peter the Great in the 18th century (Stent, 2007, p. 397). His 
policy  was  quite  revolutionary,  since  Pre-Petrine  Russia  had  internal  antipathy  to  the 
Western World as a whole (Kluchevsky, 1991, p. 4). During Peter’s rule Europe came to 
symbolize economic, political, and cultural predominance and superiority. Peter saw his 
task as emulating the European model and believed that only then would Russia become 
more  powerful.  He  imported  European  political  and  economic  ideas  to  Russia  and 
promoted Russia’s role as European diplomatic power. However, Peter the Great’s policy 
did not Europeanize Russia for two distinct reasons. First, as a result of his pro-Western 
policy Peter I created a state that did not perceive itself either as a part of Europe or as a 
country of the East, but, rather as one divided over the merits of its past and bifurcated into 
two social worlds (Legvold, 2007, p. 83). Moreover, he created a gap between national 
identities exercised by the Russian elite that was linked to the extra-national entity of the 
West and the distinct non-Western identity that was shared by the masses on the popular 
level (Legvold, 2007, p. 83). Second, when Peter the Great ascended the throne he was 
determined to modernize Russia and implement European ideas through the emulation of 
its  institutions,  but  not  its  values  (Stent,  2007,  p.  398).  The  challenge  that  successive 
Russian rulers faced was to graft European institutions onto the Russian triad of ‘autocracy, 
orthodoxy, and nationality’ by imitating the model without embracing the ideas on which 
the  model  was  based  (Wallace,  1961).  Like  modernizing  leaders  who  succeeded  him, 
including Vladimir Putin, Peter the Great was primarily concerned with making Russia a 
more  efficient  and  productive  country,  not  with  the  liberalisation  of  its  authoritarian 
political system (Stent, 2007, p. 410). The idea of Europe therefore was a means to the goal 
of becoming a great power, not adopting the European value system. 
It would be erroneous to state, however, that Russian society and leaders have not 
attempted to adopt Europe as an idea through emulation of its value system. In the 1960s 
the idea of Europe – Europe as a harbinger of democracy and human rights – once again 
inspired the Russian intelligentsia, when renowned physicist Andrei Sakharov wrote about 
the overriding need for peaceful coexistence with the West (Stent, 2007, p. 411). When 
Gorbachev came to power in the 1980s the idea of Europe and Russia’s European destiny 
once again became a subject of open discussion. Toward the end of Gorbachev era, it had 
become  possible  to  advocate  Russia’s  renouncing  its  Soviet-style  political  system  and 
moving toward a European democratic system with private property as a foundation.2 ‘We 
are  Europeans’  summarized  Michail  Gorbachev  in  his  book  on  perestroika  and  new 
thinking (Gorbachev, 1988).   
After the dissolution of the Soviet Union Russian President Boris Yeltsin and Foreign 
Minister – liberal Westernizer Andrey Kozyrev – included in their essential goals that of 
putting an end to decades of Russian isolation from the West (Kanet with Birgerson, 1997, 
p. 337) and accepting the idea of Europe (Stent, 2007, p. 417). As a result the Russian 
leadership  implemented  a  list  of  reforms  intended  to  introduce  democracy  and  de-
centralize power in the Russian state. They officially promoted the idea of Europe through 
democracy, markets and pluralism (Stent, 2007, p. 419). Therefore, Russia was looking to 
abandon its messianic ideology and replace it with aspiration to become a ‘normal power’ 
                                                           
2 For a discussion of the attraction of the West during the Gorbachev reforms see English (2000).   
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by progressing according to the generally accepted rules, ideas and values invented by the 
West (Kozyrev, 1992). 
However, as in the case with Peter the Great, the quest of the first Russian President 
to introduce European ideas was not destined to succeed. There are several reasons for 
this. The first set of reasons  is of an external nature. As argued by well-know Russian 
analyst Dmitry Trenin, even though the West invited Russia to join its club, it left the door 
half-open (Trenin, 2006, p. 87), which consequently led to the rejection of the Western 
value system by the Russian population. To start with, the promised economic aid to Russia 
was not delivered as expected. In Russia that was perceived as a sign that a former great 
power had been reduced to the humiliating level of begging the West for minute handouts 
and  caving  in  to  IMF  policies  (Kozhemiakin  and  Kanet,  1998,  p.  47).  Moreover,  NATO 
expansion to the East that included former Warsaw Pact countries, along with a number of 
other actions by the West (such as handling of the conflict in Yugoslavia) was considered 
counterproductive for Russian interests. In other words, for the first decade of its existence 
Russia was not taken seriously as a major actor in European politics and was treated much 
in the same way that the Western states dealt with developing countries – on Western 
terms only (Kanet, 2009, p. 148). In addition, the West-supported shock therapy economic 
reforms brought devastating results to Russian society (Kozhemiakin and Kanet, 1998, p. 
19).  Many Russians  blamed this  situation  on  the  shift  in Russian  internal and external 
policy, in particular on Russia’s “Westernization”. As a result, a survey of residents of the 
European part of the Russian Federation conducted only a few years after the collapse of 
the Soviet Union indicated a change in public preferences from democratic euphoria based 
on the acceptance of the Western value system to support for a more authoritarian rule of 
government (Kozhemiakin and Kanet, 1998, p. 19).  
The second group  of reasons  is  of an internal  nature, corruption  in  the  Russian 
leadership,  its  controversial  privatization  policies  and  the  inability  of  government  to 
control or administer its territory made adoption of European ideas of limits to the power 
of  rulers,  rule  of  law,  and  development  of  democracy  an  uncomfortable  paradigm  for 
Russian elite by which to rule. Therefore, it can be argued that both external and internal 
factors undermined the support of the Russian population and made it inconvenient for the 
Russian elite to adopt Europe as an idea in Russia after the end of Cold War. 
Instead of adopting European values and Europe as an idea, Russia constructed its 
own set of values and ideas. One of them is ‘sovereign democracy’. In the 21st century 
‘sovereign  democracy’  is  understood  by  the  Russian  elite  to  be  morally  the  equal  of 
Western democratic models, whose emphasis on liberal concepts of human rights have no 
roots in Russia’s historical development (Herd, 2009, p. 3). Vladislav Surkov defined the 
concept as ‘maintaining sovereignty without damaging democracy and without losing one’s 
identity’ (Surkov, 2005). The concept of ‘sovereign democracy’ is as much defined by what 
it is not or what it prevents, than what it promotes. For Russians sovereign democracy 
prevents a return to Yeltsin’s attempt to introduce the Western idea of democracy that is 
perceived as chaos and disorder, ‘capitulation’, ‘disintegration’ and ‘paralysis’ (Herd, 2009, 
p. 6). The idea of sovereign democracy is based on a unique fusion of conflicting elements: 
of tradition and postmodernity; of autocracy and democracy; of market and state control;  
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of  partnership  with  the  West  and  rejection  of  Western  values.3  But mostly, as Masha 
Lipman of the Carnegie Endowment  argues sovereign democracy projects two messages: 
‘first, that Russia’s regime is democratic, and, second, that this claim must be accepted, 
period.  Any  attempt  at  verification  will  be  regarded  as  unfriendly  and  as  meddling  in 
Russia’s domestic affairs’ (Johnson, 2007). 
The different sets of ideas by which Russia and Europe  operate are  reflected in 
tensions  over  different  normative  issues.  The  increased  obstacles  posed  by  contrasting 
governance  structures  and  different  conceptions  of  basic  political  norms,  such  as 
democracy  and  human  rights,  have  become  recurrent  issues  between  the  Russian 
Federation, the European Union and its member states, particularly the United Kingdom 
(DeBardeleben,  2009,  p.  103).  It  seems  that  ideologically  and  normatively  Russia  and 
Europe operate according to two distinct value systems and communicate in two different 
languages. For example, human rights protection during the Chechen War was not on the 
Russian agenda at all, although the restoration of order was (Nygren, 2009, p. 127). This 
state-centric Russian societal thinking stands in sharp contrast to the articulations of the 
‘individual’ found in Western thought (Nygren, 2009, p. 127). These differences are linked 
to other complex issues, such as the treatment of political opposition, non-governmental 
organizations, and the fairness of elections, political intervention on high profile cases, and 
the like (DeBardeleben, 2009, p. 102). The prospects of coming closer in ideas is bleaker, 
although here, too, the Russian tendency to rely on the state as the true holder of the public 
good, together with the lack of an effective civil society and the general popular reliance on 
a strong hand is alien to European notions of the state. Moreover, in the Russian view, the 
state is the only true interpreter of the correct societal order, the judge as well as the 
prosecutor and police against unruly popular forces.  
The  role  of  the  state  plays  an  important  part  in  Russia’s  social  construction  of 
‘sovereign democracy’ versus the European understanding of the term. As noted  in his 
work  on  Russian  national  identity  and  the  role  of  globalization,  Sergei  Kortunov  sees 
Russian identity as supranational, a civilization unity of cultural diversity where a great 
organizational effort on the part of the state has historically been required to hold together 
vast  geographic  boundaries  in  tough  climatic  and  geopolitical  conditions.  Therefore 
according  to  Kortunov  the  enforcement  of  the  state  has  always  been  perceived  as 
organizational  requirement  of  Russian  society  called  to  provide  territorial  integrity, 
security  and  social  construction  of  norms  that  would  hold  varied  ethnic  and  religious 
groups  together.  In  addition,  Russian  society  as  well  historically  gravitated  to  state 
protection  and  oversight  (Kortunov,  2008;  see,  also,  Trenin,  2006).  Because  of  these 
specifics of Russia’s historic development the interests of the state have always been put 
over the interests of individual and society and service to the state has been proclaimed 
since Peter the Great as essential to any Russian citizen. 
It is important to note, however, that recently well established Russian analysts like 
Sergey Karaganov (2007) consider Russia’s coming together with Asia as another part of its 
                                                           
3 According to Shevtsova (2006, p. 307) the central operating principles of this new system of governance consist of 
‘the  subjugation  of  all  branches  of  government  to  the  executive,  the  merger  of  political  power  and  corporate 
ownership; the combination and incorporation of incompatible governing principles, thus preventing the formation 
of political alternatives to the regime; consensus between the political class and a portion of society on the need to 
maintain the status quo; political expediency as the driving force behind the regime’s actions; and aspirations to 
great power status as a substitute for ideology’.  
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identity and idea, as a shortcut to being accepted by Europe. The attractiveness of coming 
close to Asia is in the fact that one is dealing with partners who, unlike European states and 
the EU, do not require implementation of their ideas in Russia, in particular the idea of 
democracy,  and  in  Russia’s  opinion  are  more  pragmatic  in  their  policy  orientations. 
Besides, Russian analysts see Europe as going through the crisis of the European Union 
with the  difficulties of integration  that weaken Europe  as  an international actor, while 
Asian  states  exhibit  strong  economic  growth  (Kortunov,  2008).  According  to  Kortunov 
coming  closer  to  Asia  will  demonstrate  to  Europe  that  Russia  has  a  choice  of  taking 
different  from  European  route  that  will  ultimately  enforce  its  position  in  dealing  with 
Europe (Kortunov, 2008). 
 
Europe as a Model 
 
Europe  as  a  model  has  a  different  meaning  for  Russians  than  Europe  as  an  idea.  The 
Russian elite has admired Europe as a model for modernization, advanced societies whose 
economic  achievements  were  to  be  emulated,  even  if  their  political  systems  were 
considered to be inappropriate for Russian conditions. Therefore, Europe as a model has 
appealed  to  Russian  leaders  who  wanted  Russia  to  become  a  stronger  and  more 
prosperous state without necessarily wanting it to become more democratic (Stent, 2007, 
pp. 393-394).  
Europe as a model for modernization has a profound importance for Russia’s future. 
The choice of a modernization paradigm means for Russia which developmental way it will 
select and which identity it will adopt in the current absence of clarity in Russia’s self-
identification. The codependence of modernization and identity is of extreme importance 
since  successfully  implemented  modernization  influences  culture  and,  therefore,  the 
identification  of  a  nation  (Kortunov,  2008,  p.  5).  Moreover,  the  success  of  the 
modernization itself in large part depends on its coherence and acceptance by the nation’s 
culture and, therefore, its identity (Kortunov, 2008, p. 5). For that particular reason Peter 
the  Great,  Russia’s  first  Westernizer  ruler,  chose  to  import  the  British  technique  of 
shipbuilding  into  Russia,  while  rejecting  the  institution  of  the  Parliament,  because  he 
believed that it undermined the power and dignity of the royal crown (Wittram, 1973, p. 
49). From Europe Peter also brought manufacturing and handicraft techniques to Russia; 
and  introduced  military  and  social  reforms  (Stent,  2007,  p.  401)  ‘to  bring  Muscovy’s 
universal service system to its culmination by recasting it in the European mold’ (Malia, 
1999, p. 31). 
Like  Peter  the  Great  today’s  Russian  leadership  is  fully  aware  of  the  structural 
vulnerabilities of Russia. The Russian elite is aware of the need to diversify the economy 
from resource production and encourage economic development. Some Russian analysts 
see these goals attained by emulation of the valuable European experience of collective 
protection  of  common  economic  interests,  European  investments  and  technologies  and 
valuable  European  management  experience  (Bordachev,  2009,  2010).  As  stated  by 
Presidential First Deputy Chief of Staff Vladislav Surkov ‘the more money, knowledge and 
technology we can get from the advanced countries the stronger and more sovereign our 
democracy will be’ (cited in Secriery, 2010, p. 13). 
There seems to be a clear consensus in Russian intellectual elite in favor of pro-
European way of modernization as the most appropriate for Russia (Trenin, 2006, p. 19;  
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Karaganov, 2007; Kortunov, 2008, p. 18). As summarised by Kortunov history itself makes 
choice  in  favor  of  European  modernization  and  development  taking  into  consideration 
Russia’s technological backwardness, geopolitical vulnerability and difficulty of exploring 
its natural resources along with increasing advancements of the role of Islam, increasing 
role of China, etc. Some analysts go a step further and propose the integration of Europe 
and Russia with the goal to create a world independent ‘power center’ (Bordachev, 2009) 
to balance off China and the United States (U.S.). Creation of such a political and energy 
union with Europe in Sergey Karaganov’s view is a strategic goal for Russia (Karaganov, 
2007) and will provide it with needed internal modernization: Russian energy resources in 
exchange for access to joint institutions, European investment, technology and collective 
security, as well as valuable administrative experience (Bordachev, 2010).  
However,  today’s  Europe  is  valuable  for  Russia  not  only  as  a  way  of  internal 
modernization, but also as a model for an inspiring integration project. Russia perceives 
European integration as a success story that brought peace and prosperity to the continent 
which  had  been  torn  apart  by  wars.  Therefore,  Moscow  considers  the  experience  of 
building  the  European  Union  as  a  model  to  emulate  in  the  reconstruction  of  the 
Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS). As stated by one of Russia’s top diplomats, 
Russia regards the EU as an example for regional integration and urges to make use of the 
rich European experience in the CIS space. In practice, Russia’s multilateral integration 
initiatives in the economic field can be seen as an attempt to follow the EU example. During 
the  opening  ceremony  of  the  Customs  Union  (with  Belarus  and  Kazakhstan)  Russian 
President  explained,  using  EU  jargon  that  ‘this  really  will  result  in  a  completely  new 
freedom  of  movement  of  goods,  services,  capital  and  labor’.  In  addition,  Deputy  Prime 
Minister Igor Shuvalov, in his plea for deeper economic integration with Kazakhstan and 
Belarus, argued for the introduction of a common currency, taking the Euro as an example 
(Secriery, 2010, p. 13).  
Despite the fact that both are regional integration projects, the EU and the CIS have 
some  essential differences. First, unlike  the European  Communities that were called to 
bring together the  war stricken countries of Europe, the  CIS’s initial  goal was  more  to 
establish  an  instrument  of  civilized  divorce  in  the  dissolution  of  the  Soviet  Union. 
Notwithstanding this difference, the most important achievements attained by both the CIS 
and the EU are quite comparable in the sense that both integration projects serve as a 
forum that allows leaders to keep open channels of communication among themselves. In 
addition, integration in Europe as well as in post-Soviet space prevented conflicts from 
erupting on the territories of their member states. In the case of the CIS, it assisted in 
preventing the Soviet Union from following the path of former Yugoslavia by recognising 
existing Soviet administrative  borders of the member republics, some of which had no 
historical foundation (Secriery, 2010, p. 92). Secondly, members of the CIS are some of the 
republics of the former Soviet Union4, parts of what used to be the same country united by 
a common language, culture and traditions, social networks and informal communication 
                                                           
4  It  is  important  to  note  however,  that  not  all  former  Soviet  Union  Republics  joined  the  Commonwealth  of 
Independent States. For example three former Soviet Union Republics Lithuania, Latvia and Estonia never joined 
the Commonwealth. Georgia joined the organization and consequently withdrew from it. Neither Ukraine nor 
Turkmenistan ratified the founding charter of the CIS. For a complete list of member states please go the official 
web page of the CIS Executive Committee at http://www.cis.minsk.by/index.php?id=2  
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channels.5  To some extent there is still a possibility of spe aking about the  ‘shadow’ of 
common  regional identity in the post-Soviet space (Libman, 2007).  Unlike  CIS member 
states, the first members of the European integration project were rival European states 
that had a long history of wars and hostility toward one another. Thirdly, unlike the CIS 
integration  that was more  of a  channel to create sovereignty through statehood in the 
republics that lacked independent governance institutions, the EU with time became a way 
of ‘pooling’ the sovereignty of its member states, sharing it rather than ceding or losing it 
(Libman, 2007, p. 15). 
The biggest difference between the European Union and the CIS, however, is in their 
viability. While some analysts, like Alexander Libman, say that the CIS is merely ‘imitating 
integration activity and is doomed (The CIS, 2007), it can be argued that the EU enjoys 
impressive health, just half a century after its foundation (Roy, 2007, p. 8). Among the 
reasons to blame for the failure of the CIS integration projects Libman lists the following. 
First,  post-Soviet  regionalism  does  not  succeed,  because  it  fails  to  provide  additional 
advantages  for  participating  countries.  Second,  CIS  integration  might  lock  participating 
countries into a Soviet-like matrix and, therefore, there is a low level of trust among post-
Soviet elites that prevents the establishment of cooperative equilibrium. Third, there is an 
attractive  alternative  of  integration  with  other  regional  blocs,  such  as  the  EU  for  the 
European countries (Moldova, Ukraine and Belarus) and China and the Middle East for the 
Central Asian Republics. The choice between post-Soviet and European integration makes 
the first less attractive. The reason for that is Russia’s failure to invest creative efforts in 
providing post-Soviet states with more attractive integration project (CIS, 2007). Besides, 
the current Russian elite seems to some analysts to be ambivalent about the notion of 
geopolitics and concentrates exclusively on rational economic formulae in dealing with CIS 
states. This rationality does not justify investments to preserve unity and coherence in 
post-Soviet  space  (CIS,  2007).  However,  according  to  Alexander  Libman,  competition 
between integration projects creates a social dilemma, a ‘trap of integration illusions, when 
countries that are hopeful of EU accession are not ready to enter post-Soviet integration 
projects, even if European Union integration is less realistic in the short- and medium-term 
and  there  are  possible  gains  from  deeper  cooperation  with  immediate  neighbors  (CIS, 
2007). Fourth, the problem of hegemony has been one of the central issues of integration in 
the CIS. Russia is the largest country in the region with substantial economic potential. 
There  is  a  fear  of  Russian  hegemony  on  the  part  of  the  other  republics  that  leads  to 
bilateralism  instead  of  multilateral  integration.  In  addition,  Russia  cannot  attract  other 
republics as a center of integration by uniting them around itself unless it has a clear vision 
of its doctrine and its role in post-Soviet space, until it is ready to provide with an answer 
on  what  Russia  is  and  how  it  sees  its  future  and  goals.  Finally,  the  other  reason  is 
psychological  and  is  directly  linked  to  emergence  of  nationalistic  elites  (CIS,  2007)  in 
former Soviet Republics where post-Soviet nations are developing their own identity. The 
process of self-identification and integration with Russia, which is perceived by many as 
the heir of the Soviet Union, can hardly be combined. In addition to these above listed 
reasons, Dmitry Trenin adds the following causes for the lack of successful integration in 
                                                           
5 For example, according to the estimates of the Barometer of Eurasian Integration, 35% of the Russian population, 
57% of the Ukrainian and 69% of the Belorussian have  relatives in neighbouring  CIS countries (Ekonomika i 
vremya, 2005).  
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post-Soviet space, such as the general lack of mutual interest, the paucity of resources, and 
the absence of political will. In particular, at the initial stages of integration political elite 
resisted any supranational organizations despite longing from the population in former 
Soviet Union Republics (Trenin, 2002, p. 91). 
Another  distinct  feature  of  post-Soviet  integration  is  an  array  of  competing 
integration projects. The absolute majority of them are formed by Russo centric structures 
with similar functions, underlying ideas and strategies but different memberships: the CIS 
itself, the Eurasian Economic Community (EurasEC), the Organization for Democracy and 
Economic Development (GUAM), etc. The Collective Security Treaty Organization (CSTO) is 
the political and security arm of these overlapping projects and is closely affiliated with 
EurasEC. These projects represent different attempts to establish an economic and political 
union that resembles the EU and is based on a sophisticated institutional network. In 2005 
the CIS only included eight statutory bodies, 67 sectorial bodies (ranging from disaster 
prevention to library exchanges) and nine affiliated public and private institutions such as 
Inter-State Bank, the Agricultural Union and the Leasing Confederation.  
Interestingly enough, there seem to be more similarities between Latin American 
integration processes and integration in post-Soviet space than in some cases between the 
CIS and the EU project. In their essence both Latin American and post-Soviet integration 
could be characterised by ‘presidential syndrome’ that is perceived as an obstacle for other 
integration projects, such phobia towards integration manifesting itself in strong belief in 
sovereignty (Roy p.15). In post-Soviet space it is not without merit though considering the 
common Soviet past of the CIS member states and Russia’s aspirations for hegemony in its 
near abroad. Another factor closely associated with the ‘presidential syndrome’ is the lack 
of juridical respect for norms and codes. The presidential power, both in Latin American 
countries and in the Newly Independent States, is so strong that it sidelines integration 
stipulations as well as the principles of international norms (Roy, p. 15). 
Despite a variety of integration projects in the world, the EU can be considered as 
the  most  successful  and  ambitious  accomplishment  of  voluntary  integration  and 
cooperation in world history. Today what has evolved into the EU, despite weaknesses and 
setbacks, is a successful experiment which fuses supranational governance with inter-state 
cooperation. There are several reasons for the EU success as an integration project. First of 
all,  there  has  been  a  pragmatic  political  consensus  on  the  benefits  of  integration.  The 
success of European integration is in its solid foundation that implies that the institutions 
and member states of the EU would eventually overcome a variety of difficulties facing the 
integration  project. Secondly, the  successful  evolution  of European integration  suggests 
that political commitment is a basic precondition that must be fulfilled, in order for the 
integration  scheme  to  achieve  a  positive  effect  (Rueda-Junquera,  p.  104).  Regional 
integration  requires  a  strong  political  dedication  on  the  part  of  the  participating 
governments  to  advance  towards  common  objectives.  It  is  not  enough  to  have  strong 
motivation in the initial stages of integration; there must be a strong commitment and it 
must  be  sustained  over  a  long  period.  The  most  remarkable  feature  of  the  European 
integration project has been the irreversible nature of its progress achieved through strong 
and  sustained  political  engagement.  Thirdly,  another  important  aspect  of  European 
integration is the EU’s viable and functional legal system. The functionality of Community 
law is ensured by principles of primacy and direct applicability. The principle of primacy 
ensures that Community law has supremacy over national legislation and cannot be altered  
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on the national level. The principle of direct applicability signifies that community law is 
binding.  Having  the  force  in  member  states  Community  law  is  fully  and  uniformly 
applicable through member states. However, the significance of Common law is important 
only because Member States have a culture of rule of law that ensures that they proceed in 
accordance with law, complying with commitments signed in the Treaties which constitute 
primary  law  and  binding  rules  (Rueda-Junquera,  p.  105).  The  network  of  functional 
Common institutions, as well, assisted the European integration project. These institutions 
acquired a supranational character due to the pooling of sovereignty from Member states 
making it possible, therefore, for these institutions to function appropriately. Moreover, 
decisions of these institutions have binding effect on Member states, which is essential for 
the  functioning  of  any  integration  project.  In  addition  to  the  creation  of  a  functional 
institutional framework, the European Union as well succeeded in working out the system 
for  financing  these  institutions  on  a  joint  basis,  providing  them  with  relative  budget 
independence that allows them to carry out their activities without depending entirely on 
the will of Member States (Rueda-Junquera, p. 106). Finally, some analysts note that it is 
the institutional framework and common law that provided the necessary flexibility of the 
Union to adapt to changing historic circumstances safeguarding the EU to go faster than the 
historic circumstances would.  Lastly, it can be argued that a set of common actions and 
policies  encouraging  integration  is  essential  for  European  success  as  well.  The  EU  has 
pursued  the  social  and  economic  development  of  the  Member  states  by  means  of  the 
integration  of  their  national  markets,  the  establishment  of  a  single  currency  and  the 
implementation of measures reducing the internal differences in the integrated market. 
Common  actions  and policies taken in this area  have  aimed at economic  liberalization, 
introduction of common currency and internal cohesion (Rueda-Junquera, p. 107).  
To conclude, Europe as a model is of remarkable importance to Russia both as a 
domestic  and  external  projects.  By  adopting  European  modernization  paradigm  Russia 
seeks  to  overcome  its  technological  backwardness  and  institutional  inefficiency.  In 
addition, through European model Russia has a choice to commit itself to follow European 
way  of  development  which  may  lead  Russia  to  consequently  self-identify  as  a  part  of 
Europe. Externally, European regional integration can serve as an inspiring example for 
efficient and functional cooperation on post-Soviet space. The key however is not merely to 
mimic  the  institutions  but  to  follow  the  essence  of  supranational  commitment  that  is 
crucial to the success of the EU. 
 
 
Europe as a Geopolitical Reality 
 
Europe as a reality has always been important for Russia. The Concert of Europe, in which 
Russia played a significant role, embedded Russia into European state system from 1815 to 
1914. Russia rose to prominence internationally through the European interstate system, 
whose rules it had to accept, but whose evolution it was unable to influence, since the 
system was created by the other great powers (Stent, 2007, p. 394). Issues of relations with 
Europe dominated Russian foreign policy throughout the centuries and were key elements 
in Soviet foreign policy, as well. Therefore, it is not surprising that one of Putin’s major 
goals when he came to power was to restore Russia’s role in the European state system.  As 
he admitted in 1999: ‘I only regretted that the Soviet Union had lost its place in Europe,  
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although intellectually I understood that a position based on walls and dividers cannot last. 
But I wanted something different to rise in its pace. And nothing different was proposed. 
That’s what hurt’ (Putin, 2000, p. 80). 
It can be argued that today Russia and Europe have managed somewhat to put the 
past  that  divided  them  into  two  ideologically  opposing  camps  behind  and  managed  to 
construct  a  new  different  relationship  with  one  another.  This  relationship  can  be 
characterised  by  their  close  interconnectedness  and  interdependence  as  economic 
partners.  According to the information provided by the Ministry of Statistics of Russian 
Federation Member states of the European Union are Russia’s largest trading partners – its 
significance as a geopolitical neighbour is difficult to underestimate6. Russia is significant to 
Europe mostly as an energy provider. Russia is the European Union’s largest provider of oil 
and gas imports. It will soon be supplying fifty percent of some European countries’ energy, 
including Germany and Italy. Finland, for example, imports 70 percent of its gas and 70 
percent  of  this  import  comes  from  Russia.  This  economic  significance  of  Russia  as  an 
energy provider for Europe will likely grow over the next decade (Stent, 2007, p. 425). 
Russia utilizes this energy dependence of Europe as a tool for political ends and 
attaches  high  value  to  its  energy  resources  as  a  means  of  promoting  its  policy  goals 
(Secriery,  2010,  p.  14).  The  energy  strategy  of  the  Russian  Federation  released  by  the 
Russian  Ministry  of  Energy  in  2003  underlines  the  connection  between  how  Russia 
positions itself on the energy markets and its geopolitical influence. Even though, according 
to analysts, Russia has never openly used Europe’s energy dependence as a political or 
economic lever in the time it has been exporting energy to Western Europe, it has used 
energy as  a  form of political leverage  in the post-Soviet  space, as in the  conflicts  over 
transit  with  Ukraine  and  Belarus  (Stent,  2007,  p.  425;  see  also  Nygren,  2008).  Eighty 
percent of Russia’s gas comes to Europe via Ukraine, and Europe was affected by the cutoff, 
causing some countries to question Russia’s reliability as a future supplier (Stent, 2007, p. 
426).  
It is not only Europe, however, that depends on Russia as a geopolitical player for its 
energy supplies, Europe as a consumer is extremely important to Russia, as well. Europe’s 
dependence on Russian energy dates back to the times of Cold War, when the Kremlin built 
pipelines  to Europe, despite ideological differences  to  earn  hard currency and create a 
wedge between Europe and the United States (Mankoff, 2009, p. 176). Since the bulk of 
Russia’s  existing  pipeline  infrastructure  leads  to  Europe  and  construction  of  diverting 
pipelines to Asia and other consumers will take time, the situation has created somewhat 
paradoxical  effect  making  Moscow  dependent  on  the  Europeans  as  consumers  of  their 
energy as much as it has left Europe little choice but to use Russia as a supplier (Mankoff, 
2009, p. 178).   
The other important aspect of Europe as a reality is its policy of craving for a ‘sphere 
of interest’ in the Euro-East that Russia has historically considered its domain. The Eastern 
Partnership (EaP) that aims to strengthen the EU’s relations with Russia’s western and 
southern neighbours is perceived by the Kremlin as an attempt to pull the rug from under 
Russia’s feet in the post-Soviet space – as it was bluntly put by the Russian Foreign Minister 
the EaP is an ‘attempt to extend the EU’s sphere of influence (Secrieru, 2010, p. 160). In 
                                                           
6 For the more comprehensive information on Russian external trade consult the official webpage of the Ministry 
of Statistics of Russian Federation http://www.gks.ru/bgd/free/b04_03/IssWWW.exe/Stg/d01/31.htm  
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Russia’s perception the partnership could change unfavourably the behaviour of Russia’s 
immediate neighbours and strengthen their bargaining power in relations with Moscow. 
Through exercise of its ‘soft power’ the EU’s aspiration is perceived as pulling the post-
Soviet states under its supranational governance in various fields (Secrieru, 2010, p. 160). 
The integration of different sectors through the absorption of the acquis communautaire 
and the creation of a free trade area will consequently embed eastern states in the EU’s 
legal system and, therefore, will undermine Russia’s influence. This process will run against 
the Kremlin’s plans to assemble free trade area and harmonize economic legislation in the 
CIS (Secrieru, 2010, p. 16). Therefore, Russia perceives the EU as a competitor in Eurasia, 
challenging what the some of Russian political elite considers Russia’s spheres of interest 
(Stent, 2007, p. 434). Moscow is concerned that the ex-Soviet Union states therefore will 
have  to  choose  between  ‘either  bright  future  with  the  EU  or  dark  past  with  Russia’ 
(Secrieru, 2010, p. 16) and the choice will not be in Russia’s favor.  
Lastly,  the  European  Union  itself  as  a  geopolitical  player  has  undergone  certain 
transformations  that  affect  Russia’s  perception  of  it as  a  reality.  I would  say  ‘some’  or 
‘many’ Russian analysts consider the recent enlargement as the ‘importation of issues of 
tension between Central European countries (most notably Poland and the Baltic states) 
and Russia in the EU-Russia relationship’ (DeBardeleben, 2009, p. 96). Simply speaking, the 
Baltic states and Poland, together with other Central European countries, have recently 
emerged from decades, in some cases even centuries, of Russian and Soviet domination and 
have an agenda toward Russia that differs from that of states that have been EU members 
for  a  longer  period  (Stent,  2007,  p.  431).  For  example,  Poland  effectively  asserted  its 
influence  in  the  EU  by  vetoing  the  initiation  of  negotiations  for  a  new  Partnership 
Cooperation  Agreement  (PCA)  with  Russia  in  response  to  a  Russian  embargo  on  meat 
imports from Poland (DeBardeleben, 2009, p. 100). Besides, Polish leaders became strong 
advocates of Ukraine’s NATO and EU aspirations – a touchy issue for Russia which sees the 
West’s support of the color revolutions as highly destabilizing and directed against the 
Kremlin’s power and security (Tsygankov, 2008, p. 172).7 The complexity of the various 
agendas of different member states in regards to Russia can be seen in Stanislav Secrieru’s 
insightful  classification  of  based  on  their  perception  of  Russia  into  1)  ‘psychologically 
compatible partners’ (France, Germany, Italy, Spain, Cyprus and Greece); 2) utilitarians 
(Belgium,  Bulgaria,  Ireland,  Malta,  Portugal,  Austria,  Finland,  Hungary,  Luxembourg, 
Netherlands, Slovakia and Slovenia); and 3) neighbours with the ‘phantoms of the past 
illness’  (the  UK,  the  Baltic  states,  Sweden,  Poland,  the  Czech  Republic,  Romania  and 
Denmark) (Secriery, 2010, pp. 18, 21-22). Such striking divisions inside the Union make it 
difficult for the EU to build internal consensus and come up with coherent policy on Russia. 
It  is  not  surprising,  therefore,  that  the  Kremlin  sought  ‘refuge’  for  itself  in  bilateral 
dialogues predominantly with its preferential and utilitarian partners, most of which are 
Western European states (Secriery, 2010, p. 13). Such complexity can also explain the lack 
of a unified position in Russia on dealing with the European Union and its member states. 
The  incoherence  of  institutions  inside  Russia  on  European  policy  also  adds  to  the 
complexity of dealings with the EU. As noted by Timofey Bordachev (2009), institutions 
                                                           
7 It is important to note that there has been a substantial improvement of relations between Poland and Russia since 
2009.  
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inside Russia are like members of a poorly managed soccer team, where each player takes 
both offensive, defensive and goalkeeper positions with predictably poor results. 
 
Conclusion 
 
Historically Russia’s relationship with Europe has been quite complex. In the past Russia 
demonstrated  the  tendency  toward  defensive  reactions  to  the  Western  world.  When 
Russian rulers were not successful in achieving their international objectives and in their 
opinion  were  not  receiving  sufficient  support  from  their  Western  partners,  they 
occasionally  retreated  into  periods  of  relative  isolation  (Tsygankov,  n.d.)  and  strong 
rhetoric  and  focused  on  their  Asian  side  (Stent,  2007,  p.  433).  Can  the  current 
reconsideration  of Europe  as  a  model, an idea and a  reality  represent a  return  to  this 
historic pattern by Russia?  Russia’s rejection – at least for now – of Europe’s ideas of the 
rule of law, democracy, and a transparent market economy can be in part perceived as 
signs of this reversal. Europe as a model has at times been embraced by pragmatic officials 
in Russia, but mostly in its shallow form of institutional imitation without embracing the 
essence of the model itself which is embedded in European values as can be seen in the 
case of the CIS. The reality of the new European Union that internally speaks in many 
conflicting voices on the issue of Russia further deepens complexities of Russian-European 
relations. However, the existing debates about Europe and Russia’s place in it suggest that 
Russia yet has to decide where it belongs (Stent, 2007, p. 433). One thing is clear, though, 
that Russia is determined to make that decision at its own pace and on its own terms and 
that it might be helpful for Europe to understand the internal complexities that Russia faces 
in taking these decisions. 
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